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NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SUMMARY OF NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*
OUTLINE'
Section
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0 Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. This summary is reprinted from the Sectional Assemblies Booklet issued in con-
nection with the 1957 Convention of the State Bar Association in order to provide prac-
tioners with a general guide to the new rules in condensed form.
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24. Depositions.
25. Same; Benefits of Deposition Procedures.
26. Same; Scope of Examination.
27. Same; Procedure on Depositions.
28. Same; When Depositions May be Used.
29. Privileged Matters.
30. Physical Examinations.
§ 1. Introductory; Effective Date; Rules Not Substantive. - On
July 1, 1957, an entirely new system of procedure modeled upon the
rules in force in the federal district courts went into effect in the
State of North Dakota by .order of the Supreme Court. Hereafter,
except for certain special proceedings specifically excluded from
their coverage by Rule 81, the new rules will regulate the procedure
used in the conduct of all civil actions in the district courts, the
county courts of increased jurisdiction, and-to some extent-the
justice courts.
The rules are entirely procedural in character and do not alter the
substantive law of the state, since the statutory power to promul-
gate rules vested in the Supreme Court extends only to procedural
matters. They are applicable to causes of action arising prior to
their effective date on the ground that a change in procedure by
the courts does not prejudice vested substantive rights. The back-
ground of the new rules is familiar to most members of the prof-
ession and need not be repeated here. They are the product of an
able committee composed of many of the most distinguished mem-
bers of the North Dakota judiciary and bar. They also represent a
distinct achievement not only on the part of that committee but
also on the part of the Supreme Court of North Dakota itself, since
their adoption represents the first thorough and systematic mod-
ernization of the remedial law of this jurisdiction since the days of
territorial status.
Many reasons furnished cause for the replacement of the Field
Code of Civil Procedure, the former ground-rules for civil actions
in North Dakota, with the present rules. Probably these reasons
may best be summed up in the statement that the new rules give
promise of making it possible for the legal profession to offer a bet-
ter service to the public. They are simply better suited to modern
conditions than the Field Code.
While many- alterations are made by the new rules, this summary
takes up only the major changes which appear under four headings;
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(a) Process and Jurisdiction; (b) Joinder of Parties and Claims;
(c) Pleadings; (d) Depositions and Discovery.
A. PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
§ 2. Extended Scope of Process. - The first noteworthy changes
in practice made by the: new rules are found in Rule 4, since Rules
1, 2, and 3 merely continue unchanged principles already embodied
in the law of North Dakota. Thus, Rules 1 and 2, read jointly, pre-
serve the two great reforms of the Field Code over the system of
common law pleading: the union of law and equity and the aboli-
tion of forms of action. Rule 3 likewise merely preserves former
practice, though it diverges from the Federal Rules to do so by
providing that service of a summons rather than the filing of a com-
plaint represent the starting point of an action.
Rule 4, however, introduces some new material. The longest and
most complex single enactment of the rules, it deals with the sub-
ject of process-and thus, necessarily, with the extremely impor-
tant subject of jurisdiction over parties. Rule 4 retains, it should be
emphasized, most of the features of prior practice. The form and
contents of the summons are not changed, most methods of service
permissible under the old law continue to be valid, and. in many
instances the rule merely adopts the former provisions of the Field
code verbatim. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the rules committee,
in drafting Rule 4, took advantage of the opportunity to substant-
ially extend the reach of the summons and thus make it easier to
acquire jurisdiction over parties to an action. There are four
changes which deserve mention.
§ 3. Out-of-State Service on Domiciliaries. - The first of these
changes is found in Rule 4 (e) (1), which allows service of a sum-
mons in a civil action to be made upon a domiciliary of North
Dakota even though the person served is absent from the state.
This adopts the rule of the well-known case of Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U. S. 457 (1940), wherein the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that a state could constitutionally require its domicil-
iaries to respond to its process while outside the boundaries of the
state.
Illustration:
A and B are residents of North Dakota. They become jointly
and severaly liable upon a promissory note made out to the
order of t. A departs for California for an extended vacation.
B remains in the state. C, desiring to bring action on the note,
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causes a copy of the summons to be personally delivered to B
in this state. He also mails a copy of the summons to a Califor-
nia attorney, who hands it to A in Los Angeles. Both A and B
are now equally subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
North Dakota district court and must appear and defend in
the action. A judgment against A will be entitled to full faith
and credit in California.
§ 4. Service on Non-Residents Doing Business through Agents. -
The committee also inserted a provision designed to allow the dis-
trict courts of this state to acquire in personam jurisdiction over
individuals residing in other states who are engaged in business in
North Dakota through agents, in situations where the legal dispute
involved arises from such business. This provision-Rule 4 (e) (2)
-substantially adopts the rule of Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man, 294 U. S. 623 (1935), and derives its constitutional justifica-
tion from the holding of that case.
Illustration:
A is a cattle broker residing in Montana and maintains a North
Dakota office under the supervision of B, an employee. B, on
A's behalf, purchases a herd of cattle from C in the State of
North Dakota. A fails to pay. C may commence an action
against A in a North Dakota district court by causing a sum-
mons naming A as a defendant to be delivered to B, the agent,
and sending a copy of the summons together with a notice that
service has been made upon the agent to A in Montana by
registered mail. Upon making proof of such service, C will
have perfected an in personam jurisdiction over A in North
Dakota district court. A money judgment in favor of C againt A
will be entitled to full faith and credit in Montana even though
A refuses to respond to the summons.
What happens if A is a partnership? The same procedure holds
valid under the terms of Rule 4 (d) (4).
§ 5. Service on Foreign Corporations. - Rule 4 (d) (4) embod-
ies the third of the major changes made by Rule 4, and brings up to
date statutory provisions relating to service upon foreign corpora-
tions which developments in the case law had rendered slightly out
of date. While the change is less sweeping than the innovations al-
ready mertioned, it nevertheless should .be noted.
The rule provides that service of process upon a foreign corpor-
ation may be made by delivering .a copy of the summons to an
"officer, director, superintendent or managing or general agent."
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However, it also adds that service may be made upon "any other
agent" who ,is "authorized by appointment or by law" to receive
service of process.
The scope of this language deserves notice. When, exactly, is an
agent "authorized by law" to receive service of process upon an
out-of-state corporation? The answer is supplied by International
Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). That
case holds that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation whenever the corporation carries on activities within
its borders of such a character as to make it "reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice" to require the corporation to respond to the state's process.
No "mechanical" or "quantitative" test (e.g., "systematic solicita-
tion" or solicitation "plus") is determinative, though undoubtedly
if a corporation has been carrying on a systematic solicitation within
a state that fact will be highly persuasive.
Rule 4 (d) (4) plainly embodies the rule of the International
Shoe case in the law of this state, and allows jurisdiction to be ac-
quired by service of process upon an agent (e.g., a salesman) in any
case where it is "reasonable and just" to hold the corporation.
§ 6. Service by Publication. - For the most part, Rule 4 continues
without change previous statutory provisions relating to service of
process by publication. It should be noted, however, that the rule
omits the previous requirement that the complaint be verified be-
fore service by publication is permitted.
B. JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
§ 7. Principles of Joinder Based on Concept of Convenience.
It is undoubtedly in connection with the provisions relating to join-
der of claims and parties that the new rules make their most radical
departure from prior law. Joinder of causes of action under the
Field Code depended upon the provisions of NDRC 1943 § 28-
0703, a thoroughly antiquated and unscientific statute which sub-
divided or classified causes of action into various categories and
would. not permit a cause of action falling in. one category to be
joined with a cause of action falling in another .unless they hap-
pened .to arise from the same transaction or were connected with
the same subject of action.
Thus, under the old statute, if a plaintiff had a cause of action
sounding in contract against-a defendant, and also had a cause .of
action sounding in tort, two separate lawsuits were. ordinarily re-
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quired to dispose of them. This was a situation resulting in needless
loss of time and disproportionate expense to litigants. Similarly,
the former statutory provisions often failed to permit joinder of
parties in situations where it was desirable. Thus, parties could not
be joined as alternative defendants or plaintiffs.
This situation has been sharply altered. Rules 13, 14, 18, 19, 20
and 42 - the significant provisions - revise the entire field of join-
der. The objective of this group of rules may be summed up in the
single word convenience. The basic idea is that joinder of claims
and parties should be permitted in any situation where it gives pro-
wise of saving time, trouble and expense for the litigants, attorneys,
and courts. For this reason, the rules are designed to make it poss-
ible for all claims of all parties to a transaction or occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences involving common questions
ot law and fact, to be resolved in one proceeding. Thus, under the
new rules it will be possible to obtain results in a single proceeding
which would often have required two or three separate lawsuits
under the Code.
Illustration:
A owns Blackacre. B, a neighbor, commits a trespass upon A's
land. Some weeks later, B accuses A falsely of stealing his cat-
tle. Under the former code provision, A would have to bring
two actions: one for trespass and another for defamation.
Under Rule 20, A can gain redress for both claims in a single
proceeding, thereby saving money and time, unless under Rule
42 the Court determines that it would be more convenient or
just to require the claims to be tried separately.
In order to accomplish this basic objective of convenience, the
rules have been built around three underlying principles. An ex-
amination of these principles will indicate the manner in which the
rules are intended to operate.
In the first place, the framers of the Federal Rules commenced
with the premise that every "claim" or cause of action arises from
a factual happening - a transaction or occurrence of some sort.
Thus, a claim for damages for personal injuries always arises from
some type of tort, e.g., an automobile accident, an assault, a bat-
tery, and the like. Such an accident, assault, or battery constitutes a
"transaction" or "occurrence" within the purview of the rules. The
determination of when a happening constitutes a transaction or
occurrence is made on the basis of common sense. If an event or
happening creates a set of facts from which claims arise appro-
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priate for judicial resolution, it constitutes a transaction or occur-
rence within the meaning of the rules.
The principles of joinder embodied in the rules are based on
this idea, and consist of the following:
§ 8. Unlimited Joinder of Claims. - The first principle is simply
that a party who claims injury as a result of the acts of another may
join in one action as many claims as he possesses against the ad-
verse phrty. The new rules permit absolutely unlimited joinder of
claims in a single complaint. This provision, found in Rule 18, is
supplemented by another found in Rule 13 (b): the rules equally
permit unlimited joinder of counterclaims in a single answer.
Illustration:
A and B are husband and wife. A, the wife, sues B. In her com-
plaint she is entitled, under the terms of Rule 18, to join claims
for divorce, assault and battery, conversion of property, breach
of contract, and trespass to realty. In his anwer, B is entitled
under Rule 13 (b) to set forth counterclaims for annulment,
replevin, trover, to quiet title to realty, and defamation.
There is, of course, an obvious danger that so many issues will be
raised in cases of this sort that the court will be confronted with a
sort of legal pot-pourri. But the rules provide a safeguard against
precisely this sort of danger. Rule 42 provides that the court, "in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice," may order a
separate trial for different claims in its discretion. This makes it
possible to sort out the different aspects of the case and pass upon
them in a logical and orderly fashion whenever a cause shows
signs of becoming too complicated to be readily handled.
Illustration:
In the hypothetical case set forth above, on application of t-he
attorney for either party, or of its own volitioin, the Court might
appropriately order the annulment and divorce claims to be
tried separately, the claims involving rights to property to be
tried separately, and the claims involving personal torts to be
tried separately, if it appeared this was desirable in the inter-
ests of convenience or to avoid prejudice. This would be a
permissible and logical application of the court's discretionary
powers under Rule 42.
It is, of course, the normal situation that claims presented in a
civil action have their origin in a single transaction or occurrence.
However, joinder does not depend on this fact. A plaintiff may join
as many claims as he has against a defendant, and a defendant may
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join as many counterclaims as he has against a plaintiff, whether the
claims spring from a single event or from a series of transactions or
occurrences.
The principle of unlimited joinder may seem at first glance a
striking one. Indeed, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were first adopted, the principle drew criticism from many prac-
titioners in the federal courts. However, Rule 18 has stood the test
of time and has proven in most instances distinctly superior to the
procedure it superseded.
§9. Completeness of Adjudication; Compulsory Counterclaims. -
The second principle underlying the various rules which relate to
joinder of claims and parties is that whenever a transaction or oc-
currence is pleaded as a basis of a claim, all other claims of the
parties arising from that transaction or occurence should also
be adjudicated. Thus, when any portion of a transaction or occur-
rence is pleaded to a court in stating a claim, the entire transaction
or occurrence is automatically placed in issue.
This principle explains the meaning and operation of Rule 13
(a), dealing with compulsory counterclaims. Under the rules,
counterclaims are divided into two categories, permissive and com-
pulsory. Permissive counterclaims are those which may be pleaded
under the principle of unlimited joinder set forth above. Compul-
sory counterclaims are counterclaims which must be pleaded be-
cause they arise from the transaction or occurrence which is the
basis of the plaintiffs claim.
Illustration:
A and B are involved in an automobile accident. A sues B for
damages. B fails to file a counterclaim. Under the old statutes,
B could initiate a suit against A arising out of the accident
after A's suit had been disposed of. Restatement, Judgments
§58 (1942). Under the new rules, B's failure to file a counter-
claim to A's suit waives forever his right to seek relief from the
courts so far as the accident is concerned, since the counter-
claim was compulsory under Rule 13 (b) as arising from the
transaction or occurrence which was the basis of A's claim.
The result set forth in the preceding illustration obviously stems
from principles of res judicata. Under the rules, a court's decision
of a case becomes res judicata as between the parties as to all as-
pects of the transaction or occurrence which is the basis of the suit.
Failure to file a counterclaim which is compulsory under the rules
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is thus equivalent to a judgment against the counterclaim as it
might have been presented.
The thinking underlying this principle is founded once again
upon the idea of convenience, since it is obviously far more bene-
ficial to all parties concerned in terms of saving time and money if
the court passes upon all aspects of a given happening at one time
than if the court must adjudicate the controversy by piecemeal
stages. However, one warning should be given about the operation
of Rule 13 (b). Quite plainly, there will be many instances in which
a defense attorney will be in doubt as to whether a sufficient logical
relationship exists between a claim and a counterclaim to make the
counterclaim compulsory. If a defendant's attorney is in ang doubt
as to the nature of a counterclaim his client possesses, careful prac-
tice indicates that the counterclaim should be pleaded in order to
protect the client.
§ 10. Flexibility of Joinder of Parties. - The third basic principle
underlying the rules relating to joinder of parties and claims is that
whenever a transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or oc-
currences involving common questions of law and fact, comes be-
fore the court, the claims of all parties involved should be resolvable
in a single proceeding so far as possible. Thus, the rules provide
mechanisms whereby - assuming jurisdiction can be obtained -
all parties involved in a transaction or occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences involving common questions of law and fact,
can be joined as co-plaintiffs, co-defendants, or third-party defen-
dants.
The foregoing principle furnishes the explanation for Rule 14
(third-party practice) and also explains why Rule 13 (g)permits
a defendant's answer to set forth a cross-claim against a co-defen-
dant. It also explains why Rule 20 permits joinder of both plaintiffs
and defendants jointly, severally, or in the alternative, and why
Rule 42 (a) permits the court to order the consolidation of actions
involving common questions of law and fact.
Thus, where multiple parties are involved in a lawsuit, the rules
permit - indeed require - all claims as between all parties to be
presented for adjudication.
Illustration:
A is riding as the guest of B in an automobile -which is involved
in a three-car collision with vehicles driven by. C and D. A
sustains serious injuries. All three vehicles are- damaged.
1. Under Rule 20, A and B may join as co-plaintiffs in an action
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against C and D even though A is seeking damages for person-
al injuries and B is seeking damages for injury to property. This
is because Rule 20 provides that a plaintiff need not be inter-
ested in obtaining all the relief demanded, and further pro-
vides that all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
2. Under Rule 20, A may join B, C, and D as defendants on the
theory that if C and D are not liable to him, B is. This is be-
cause Rule 20 permits joinder of defendants if joint, several,
or alternative liability is asserted against them.
3. Assuming that A sues only C and D, he may contend that
if C is not liable to him, D. is, and vice versa, on the same theory
set forth in the preceding paragraph.
4. Assuming that A sues B, C, and D as co-defendants, B, C,
and D are entitled to assert cross-claims against one another in
their answers, either for contribution as joint tort-feasors or on
the theory that the other parties are solely liable or both. See
Rule 13 (g).
5. Assuming that A sues only C and D, C and D may cause a
third-party summons and complaint to be served upon B and
thereby bring him into the action as a third-party defendant.
This is because Rule 14 provides that "At any time after com-
mencement of the action a defendant as a third-party plaintiff
may cause to be served a summons and complaint upon a per-
son not a party to the action who is or may be liable to such
third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against
him."
As the illustration above indicates, the tendency of the rules is to
bring before the court every claim of every party to a transaction or
occurrence so that they may be adjusted in one proceeding.
§ 11. Summary of Joinder. - To sum up, the new rules abandon
the following:
(1) All restrictions on joinder of claims and counterclaims
where the parties are the same;
(2) All restrictions on joinder of defenses;
(3) All restrictions on joinder of actions and counterclaims
which involve different parties except one, namely, that they
must all arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
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transactions and occurrences and involve the common questions
of law or fact.
The underlying theory of joinder is one of convenience to liti-
gants and the court. Joinder is practically unlimited save that the
court may order separate trial of claims where it appears desirable
as a practical matter. Consolidation of cases may be had where it
appears desirable. The complete adjudication of all issues in one
proceeding is encouraged and, in fact required as far as possible.
The rules attempt to make it possible to bring all persons concerned
in a given transaction or occurrence as parties - assuming jurisdic-
tion can be obtained of them - so that complete resolution of all
issues between all parties can be had whenever practical.
C. PLEADINGS
§ 12. Purpose of Pleading Under New Rules. - In comparison to
the changes made in the law of joinder, the alterations the new
rules make in the law regulating pleadings are somewhat less
sweeping. Nevertheless, the changes are distinctive enough; and
they deserve careful study.
Briefly put, the effort of the new rules with regard to pleadings
is to establish a system of pleading which is as simple and non-
technical as possible. Under the rules, pleadings are limited to the
accomplishment of a few minimal purposes: (1) the giving notice
of the general nature of the claim asserted; (2) the sufficient deline-
ation of the nature of the transaction or occurrence involved in the
case to permit the subsequent application of res judicata when the
case has been decided; and (3) the indication of the nature of the
case being presented so that the court may assign it the proper
method of trial, e.g., as a law or equity matter.
The formulation of the issues in the case on a detailed basis is no
longer the function of the pleadings. Instead, the development of
facts and issues is accomplished through the use of other proced-
ures established by the rules: the use of deposition procedures,
written interrogatories, discovery procedures, and pre-trial confer-
ences.
Since the importance of the pleadings has thus been downgrad-
ed, considerable effort has been devoted to framing the rules in
such a fashion as to avoid needless sparring over their technical
sufficiency. Thus, Rule 15 establishes a liberal policy of allowing a
pleader to amend when he decides there may be uncertainty over
the sufficiency of his pleading. Rule 7 (c) goes even further in this
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direction by providing that demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for
insufficiency of a pleading shall not be used. And the former re-
quirement that the pleadings set forth the "ulitmate facts" of the
case is conspicuous by its absence.
§13. Preliminary Attacks on Pleadings. - The foregoing does not
mean, of course, that every pleading must automatically be accept-
ed as setting forth the basis of a valid case. If a defendant's attorney
is convinced that his opponent's complaint pleads a weak or in-
substantial case, the rules give him the opportunity to attack im-
mediately and in force. Indeed, while the demurrer has been abol-
ished, the procedures for disposing of a case prior to trial furnished
by the rules give the practitioner a group of far more effective
weapons for his arsenal. Three motions may be classified as being,
in effect, substitutes for the old demurrer. They are:
1. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Rule 12 (b).
2. The motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rule 12 (c).
3. The motion for summary judgment. Rule 56.
In the normal case, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings tend to perform substantially the function
of the demurrer. However, they differ from it in at least one major
respect. A pleader who makes a motion to dimiss for failure to
state a claim or a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not lim-
ited - as he would be on general demurrer - to merely attacking
the face of the opposing pleading as insufficient. He may instead go
behind the allegations made in the pleadings, striking at defects in
the factual heart of the opposing case. For this purpose, the rules
provide that affidavits and depositions showing that the formal al-
legations of the opposing pleading are unsupported by the facts
may be tendered in aid of such motions. When this occurs, however,
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings is treated by the rules as equivalent to a
motion for summary judgment. Consequently, Rule 56, relating to
motions for summary judgment, becomes applicable:
Illustration:
A sues B, alleging that he loaned B $1000 and that B has failed
to pay. Under the old law, such a complaint would not be de-
murrable for failing to state a cause of action. Under the rules,
B may move to dismiss for failure to state .a claim on which
relief may be granted. He may then tender in support of the
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motion affidavits and depositions showing clearly that he has
in fact repaid the money. The motion to dimiss will be treated
as a motion for summary judgment, and if the court finds that
the affiidavits and depositions eliminate the issues in the case,
judgment may be rendered for B on the merits of the contro-
versy.
The policy underlying the rules in this regard is two-fold in
character. First, the rules seek to avoid the sort of argument over
the pleadings which amounts to obstruction for obstruction's sake,
such as an argument over whether a pleading states "conclusion,"
"ultimate facts." or "evidentiary facts." Second, the rules are de-
signed to make it possible to dispose of weak or unfounded cases
before the parties have reached the trial stage by permitting sub-
stantial and serious weaknesses in a party's case to be presented to
the court early in the proceedings.
§ 14. Permissible Pleadings. - The permissible pleadings under
the new rules are a complaint, an answer, a reply under some con-
ditions (see § 16, infra), an answer to a cross-claim, a third-party
complaint, and a third-party answer. It is possible that a motion
under Rule 12 may also be classified as a pleading in some cases,
since it may be used to raise issues which may also be raised in the
answer.
§ 15. Complaints. - Rule 8 (a) states that a "pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of
several different types may be demanded."
The rule makes two changes with regard to the complaint when
compared to the former statutes. First, instead of requiring the
complaint to set forth the "facts constituting the cause of action"
as under the former practice, Rule 8 (a) requires a complaint mere-
ly to state a "claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Second, instead of requiring a pleader to set forth the "ultimate
facts," the rule permits a pleader to state his claim in what may be
called a system of modified fact pleading. Evidentiary facts and in
some cases pure conclusions of law may be set forth in the com-
plaint without detracting from its sufficiency. What has been estab-
lished comes very close to being a system of pure notice pleading.
However, it is settled that a complaint must nevertheless contain
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sufficient averments of fact to establish a basis for relief. As Judge
Charles E. Clark has put it, "In general, sound rules of pleading are
not greatly changed, and so far as you haven't stated any basis of
facts at all, you wouldn't get any relief."
A reading of the illustrative forms appended to the rules will fur-
nish far more information on this subject than many pages of text
discussion. In contract cases, the rules permit extremely terse com-
plaints, comparable in nature to the "common counts" permitted
under the common law system of pleading. Thus, Form 3, a com-
plaint on an account, consists solely of one sentence - "Defendant
owes plaintiff one thousand dollars according to the account hereto
annexed as Exhibit 1" - followed by a demand for judgment. Form
5 is equally simple: "Defendant owes plaintiff one thousand dollars
for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June 1, 1953." Com-
plaints in other types of causes - e.g., tort actions - require some-
what more detailed allegations. However, as the writer has pointed
out in discussing this subject in the North Dakota Law Review,
the change worked out by the new rules has been foreshadowed
by many decisions of the North Dakota court sanctioning forms of
pleading almost equally simple. Thus, common count pleading has
been permitted here in the past. And extremely broad and general
allegations of negligent conduct have been often upheld in tort
cases.
§ 16. Answers. - As is true of the complaint, the answer survives
under the new rules with only relatively minor changes. However,
the pleader is permitted to do some things not allowed under the
code. Thus, an answer may state a cross-claim against a co-defen-
dant, e.g., asking contribution from a joint tort-feasor or demanding
damages. Similarly, the issue of jurisdiction may be tendered in an
answer which also pleads to the merits of the case without waiving
the right to question jurisdiction - a provision which has the effect
of making much learning regarding special appearances obsolete.
Illustration:
A brings an action against B for breach of contract. B files a
motion to make the allegations of the complaint more definite
and certain. The motion is granted. B now files an answer in
which he (1) denies that the court has jurisdiction over him;
(2) denies the allegations of the complaint; (3) pleads the affirma-
tive defense of accord and satisfaction. A contends that by. making
his motion and pleading to the merits, B has submitted to the juris-
diction of the court. The holding of the court under the rules should
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be otherwise. (See 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, 759 et seq.)
The answer under the new rules retains the distinction familiar
to practitioners between matter in denial and new matter in con-
fession and avoidance, e.g., between pleas which traverse the al-
legations of the complaint and pleas which are affirmative in char-
acter. Rule 8 (c), however, goes further than previous law in de-
fining affirmative defenses and contains a listing of about 20 affirma-
tive defenses which must be specifically pleaded. A general denial
is permitted under the rules as under the Code. Subject to an ethical
obligation of goodfaith imposed by Rule 11.
The rules continue former practice in permitting inconsistent de-
fenses to be pleaded in an answer. They also allow alternative and
hypothetical allegations - see Rule 8 (d) which have not form-
erly been used here.
As noted in the preceding section, the rules make an important
change with regard to counterclaims, dividing them into two class-
es: permissive and compulsory. A defendant may plead in his ans-
wer any counterclaim which he has against a plaintiff as a permis-
sive counterclaim. He must plead as compulsory counterclaims any
claims against the adverse party stemming from a transaction or
occurrence set forth in the opposing pleading, on pain of waiver.
§ 17. Replies. - In most cases, unless numerous parties are in-
volved, pleadings under the new rules will consist solely of a com-
plaint and answer, since the rules are intended to establish a
two-stage system of pleading. However, under Rule 7 (a), replies
will be used under the new rules in two situations: (1) a reply
must be filed to a counterclaim; (2) a reply must be filed to an
answer where the court, in its discretion, deems it advisable so to
require. Practice as to replies is not greatly changed by the new
rules.
§ 18. Third-Party Pleadings. - These pleadings are governed
substantially by rules applicable to pleadings already discussed.
See § 10, supra.
§ 19. Motions. - Rule 12 governs most motions made in connec-
tion with pleadings. Thus, Rule 12 (b) allows a defendant to set
forth seven types of defenses by motion rather than answer. These
are (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency
of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (7) failure to
1957]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
join an indispensable party. It should be noted that this rule fur-
nishes an option instead of imposing a requirement, since, each of
the foregoing defenses may be set forth with equal effect in the ans-
wer. Rule 12 (c) permits a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
Rule 12 (e) permits a motion for more definite statement, and Rule
12 (f) permits a motion to strike.
§ 20. Same; Motion Practice Generally. - The rules contain an
important provision regarding motions which is designed to expe-
dite the trial of a case by eliminating dilatory motions. This is the
provision found in Rules 12 (g) and (h) to the effect that a party
who makes a motion must include in it all defenses and objections
available to him which Rule 12 permits to be made by motion, upon
penalty of waiving such defenses and objections. The practical ef-
fect of this rule is to limit a party to one preliminary motion before
trial.
Illustration:
A brings an action against B for negligence. B files a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which reilef can be
granted. The court holds a preliminary hearing upon this mo-
tion as specified in Rule 12 (d) and overrules the motion. B
now files a motion for more definite statement of A's claim.
This should be denied as out of order, since B could have re-
quested such relief in his previous motion and Rule 12 (g)
provides that "if a party makes a motion under this rule and
does not include therein all defenses and objections then avail-
able to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he
shall not thereafter make a motion based -on any of the de-
fenses or objections so omitted ... "
The rule set forth above is designed to avoid a situation wherein
a defendant may, by making successive preliminary motions - e.g.,
a motion for change of venue followed by a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim followed by a motion to strike - greatly
delay the trial of a case.
§ 21. Matters Which Must Be Specially Pleaded. - Both Rule
8 (c) and Rule 9 contain a listing of matters which must be spec-
ially pleaded or are subject to special rules of pleading. Rule 8 (c)
requires an answer to plead specifically any affirmative defense,
and lists these as including accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, il-
legality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
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res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations and waiver.
Rule 9 requires a pleader to set forth with particularity such matters
as lack of capacity, fraud, mistake and special damages. However,
it permits general allegations of such matters as condition of the
mind (malice, intent, knowledge), the performance of conditions
precedent, and the validity of a judgment.
D. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
§ 22. Purpose of Discovery Procedures. - The importance and
the effect of the pre-trial, deposition, and discovery procedures em-
bodied in the new rules has been well summarized by Mr. Justice
Murphy of the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U. S. 495, 501 (1947):
"The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established
by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal
practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formula-
tion, and fact revelation were performed primarily and inade-
quately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and facts be-
fore trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in
method. The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the
task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discov-
ery process with the vital role in the preparation for trial. The
various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device,
along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties and (2) as a device
for ascertaining the facts or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials
in the federal courts no longer need to be carried on in the
dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privil-
eges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before trial . .. "
Further in the opinion it was said:
"The deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of
'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual know-
ledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essen-
tial to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage
at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial
to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of
surprise." 329 U. S. at 507.
These observations are applicable to the North Dakota rules.
§ 23. Pre-Trial Conferences. - Most practitioners in this state
are familiar with the use of pre-trial conferences, which have been
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employed in this state since 1943. The practice is summarized ex-
tremely well in Crimson, Progress Report on Pre-Trial Conferences
in North Dakota, 30 N. Dak. L. Rev. 85 (1954). Rule 16 continues
without change the former provision.
§ 24. Depositions. - The provisions of the new rules relating to
depositions form one of their most significant features. These are
found in Rules 26 thru 32, and when read in connection with Rule
33 (Written Interrogatories to Parties), Rule 34 (Discovery and
Production of Documents and Things for Inspection, Copying, or
Photographing), Rule 35 (Physical and Mental Examination of
Persons) and Rule 36 (Requests for admission of Facts and of
Genuineness of Documents) form a comprehensive system for the
development of evidence and the formulation of issues in a case.
Under the rules a deposition may be taken either before or after
an action has been formally commenced. Rule 27 provides that a
person who expects to be a party to a litigation in the future and
finds it desirable to perpetuate or establish testimony for purposes
of that action may petition the court for an order authorizing him
to take depositions from persons named in the petition. Upon notice
to adverse parties and a finding by the court that the perpetuation
of the testimony is desirable, an order authorizing such depositions
will be granted.
Rule 26 deals with the more common situation where an action
has been formally commenced and depositions are desired. It per-
mits any party to "take the testimony of any person, including a
party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interroga-
tories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the ac-
tion or for both purposes." It may be noted that Rule 26 (a) auth-
orizes a defendant to commence taking depositions immediately
after the action has been commenced, but requires the plaintiff to
obtain leave of court (with or without notice to the other side) if
he desires to begin taking depositions prior to 20 days after com-
mencement of the action. NDRC 1943 § 31-0502, the superseded
statute, authorized either party to commence taking depositions
immediately after service of process. It would appear that such per-
mission to a plaintiff would ordinarily be granted almost pro forma.
§ 25. Same; Benefits of Deposition Procedure. - Litigation under
the Federal Rules has been marked by extensive use of the deposi-
tion procedure. -This characteristic has been so marked, in fact, that
some commentators have warned there is a danger of abuse in the
view of the expense often involved. This danger, however, has not
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materialized in the past in this state, although extremely liberal
deposition procedures were formerly provided by the Code. The
benefits to be derived from taking the testimony of witnesses and
parties in this fashion have been listed by Professor Moore as
follows:
1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury, for the following reasons:
(a) The deponent is examined while his memory is fresh.
(b) The deponent is generally not coached in preparation
for a pre-trial oral examination with the result that his testi-
mony is likely to be more spontaneous.
(c) A party or witness whose deposition has been taken at
an early stage in the litigation cannot, at a later date, readily
manufacture testimony in contradiction of his deposition.
(d) Testimony is preserved so that if a witness dies or be-
comes unavailable at the trial his deposition is available.
2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inex-
pensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved,
except with the greatest difficulty and sometimes not at all.
4. It educates the parties in advance of the trial as to the real
value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settle-
ments out of court.
5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the
courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and
dismissals which would otherwise have to be tried.
6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays,
and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expe-
diting the trial.
7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.
§ 26 Same; Scope of Examination. - The examination which
may be made of an adverse party or witness upon deposition is an
extremely broad one, being limited only by two factors. Rule 26 (b)
provides that the examination (1) can extend only to relevant
matters and (2) cannot inquire into matters which are surrounded
by a privilege. It is specifically provided that "It is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the
testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence."
A party does not, by taking the deposition of a person, make that
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person his witness. Consequently he is not bound by the deponent's
testimony. Indeed, one fundamental purpose of the deposition pro-
cedure is to enable a party to obtain material which he may later
use in impeaching a deponent if there later occurs a change in testi-
mony. Rule 27 (f), however, provides that if a party introduces a
deposition into evidence for any purpose otheI than contradicting
or impeaching a witness, he thereby makes the deponent his wit-
ness in most instances. The effect of this is mitigated by the last
sentence of the rule: "At the trial or hearing any party may rebut
any relevant evidence contained in a deposition whether intro-
duced by him or by any other party."
The requirement that the examination be confined to relevant
matters is plainly very general, particularily since in many instances
depositions may be taken before the formal issues in the case have
been established by the pleadings. In this situation the standard
by which relevancy must be judged is very difficult to define clearly.
The cases and writings of commentators indicate that when this
occurs the requirement of relevancy is given a broad interpretation.
Another limitation upon the scope of the examination which de-
serves mention is found in Rule 30 (d). This rule provides that
upon a showing that an examination is being conducted in bad
faith or "in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party," the court (not the officer before
whom the examination is being conducted) may order the taking
of the deposition terminated or may limit the scope and manner of
taking the deposition.
Cross-examination, of course, is perfectly permissible.
§ 27. Procedure of Taking Depositions. - Depositions may be
taken in either of two ways, orally or by written interrogatories.
Rule 28 (a) provides that they may be taken anywhere in the
United States, territories, or insular possessions before an officer
authorized to administer oaths or by any person appointed by the
court wherein the action is pending. This would include a notary
public.
Oral depositions may be taken by any party by giving reasonable
notice of the time and place for the examination to the deponent
and to every other party to the action. What is a reasonable notice?
This is a matter left to the discretion of the court, which may grant
relief under Rule 30 (b) where the time or place specified in the
notice appear prejudicial.
What happens when an examination departs from permissible
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limits by becoming irrelevant or touching upon privileged matter?
The prejudiced party may object to the line the examination is
taking and the objection must be noted by the officer presiding at
the examination; Irrelevant questions must nevertheless be ans-
wered, since Rule 30 (b) declares that "Evidence objected to shall
be taken subject to the objections." The proper remedy consists in
thereafter excluding the irrelevant matter by calling the attention
of the court to it at the trial by objection or otherwise.
A question touching upon a privileged matter calls for a different
procedure. The deponent need not answer such questions. The
examiner must then apply to the court for an order requiring the
deponent to answer, and the court will pass upon the question
whether the claimed privilege is applicable. The procedure is
set forth in Rule 37. The question of when privilege is, present is
discussed in section 29 of this paper.
Rule 31 sets forth the procedure for taking depositions by inter-
rogatory, a convenient procedure where the deponent is located
so far away that personal examination would be unduly expensive
or difficult.
When the deposition is completed, it must be certified by the
officer before whom it was taken and filed with the court. It must
also be signed by the deponent, though if the deponent refuses to
sign all that_ happens is that the presiding officer must certify that
fact, together with the reason for the refusal if it is given.
§ 28. When Deposition May Be Used. - Rule 26 (d) (3) pro-
vides that the-deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is at a greater distance
than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing,or is out of the
state, unless the absence of the witness was procured by the party
tendering the deposition; (3) that the witness is unable to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment; (4) that the
witness cannot be brought to the court by subpoena; (5) that ex-
ceptional circumstances make it desirable in the interests of justice.
Rule 26 (d) (1) permits use of a deposition for contradiction or
impeachment.
§ 29. Privileged Matters; Written Interrogatories. - The law of
evidence which governs the actual trial also governs at the exam-
ination of a witness or party by deposition or by written interrog-
atories. Rule 26 (b) specifically provides that a deponent need not
disclose privileged material.
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Most of the cases under Federal Rules involving questions of
privilege have arisen in connection with the use of written inter-
rogatories. This is because Rule 33 allows, written interrogatories a
scope quite as broad as the oral examination of a deponent. Pro-
cedure in connection with written interrogatories is extremely
simple. Any party may serve such interrogatories upon any other
party. They must be answered separately and fully in writing under
oath within 15 days unless the party being interrogated serves writ-
ten objections to them, in which case answers may be deferred
until the objections are determined.
The leading case on the question of privilege is Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947). A seaman died when a tug capsized. His
widow brought action and submitted written interrogatories to the
defendant. One of them read:
"State whether any statements of the members of the crews
of the tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other
vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car
float and the sinking of the tug 'J. M. Taylor'. Attach hereto
exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral,
set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral state-
ments or reports."
The defendant objected on the ground this interrogatory called
for the production of privileged documents. The objection was
overruled in the trial court, but held to be well taken in an opinion
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court ruled that memoranda, statements and mental im-
pressions of counsel prepared or obtained from interviews with
witnesses in preparation for litigation after a claim has arisen are
not within the attorney-client privilege and not protected from
discovery on that basis. 329 U. S. 508. This was on the theory that
the attorney-client privilege relates to confidential communications
made by the client to the attorney, not to statements obtained from
third parties or witnesses. However, the court felt that it ought to
pursue nevertheless a general policy "against invading the privacy
of the attorney's course of preparation for litigation." Consequently
while it stated that where "relevant and non-privileged facts remain
hidden in the attorney's file and where production of these facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly
be had," it was nevertheless held that the burden of showing cause
why such materials should be produced rested upon the party who
was seeking discovery. Since no showing had been made in the
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case, the defendant's action in refusing to respond to the interrog-
atory was upheld.
Other questions of privilege will doubtless suggest themselves to
the reader, e.g., questions involving the doctor-client privilege, con-
fidential communications between husband and wife, statements
made by employees of a corporation to the corporation's legal coun-
sel, statements to insurers, questions of incriminating character, and
the like. Detailed discussion of these is impractical in a summary of
this character; they can only be mentioned in passing.
§ 30. Physical Examinations. - One aspect of the problem which
nevertheless deserves mention is Rule 35. This provides that in an
action in which the mental or physical condition or the blood rela-
tionship of a party, or of an agent, or a person in the custody or
under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a
physical, mental, or blood examination by a physician or to produce
for such examination his agent or the person in his custody or legal.
control.
This rule does not violate any substantive right or privilege of
personal privacy. It is nevertheless provided that such examination
may be made only on motion for cause shown. When such an ex-
amination is made, however, the practical effect will normally be to
cause a complete waiver of the doctor-patient privilege. This is be-
cause Rule 35 (b) (2) provides that "By requesting and obtaining
a report of the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition
of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may
have in that action or any other involving the same controversy,
regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or
may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or phys-
ical condition."
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